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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Banking concentration and developments 
in FYROM: A country in transition
 Nikolas Hourvouliades1* and Ljupco Davcev2
Abstract: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) belongs to the 
transition economies that have  witnessed significant structural changes in their 
domestic markets during the 2000s. We examine the evolution of the banking 
competition from 2003 until 2011, covering the first period of economic growth 
 followed by the acute financial crisis that still threatens European countries. We 
apply the Herfindahl–Hirschman index and the CR3 and CR5 indicators in order to 
estimate banking concentration on five industry variables. Our findings show that 
the market has been persistently  operating under oligopolistic, if not  monopolistic, 
 conditions where the leading three or five institutions dominate the market. 
Foreign newcomers and  legislative developments have not changed the  situation 
during the past 10 years and bank customers seem to keep their preferences 
unaffected, staying loyal to their prior choices. We analyze the banking sector 
profitability since 2008 and during the  economic crisis, as well as the operational 
performance and the future trends  concerning this sector.
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RESEARCH GROUP OVERVIEW
Our main focus of research has been the capital 
markets and the investment alternatives available, 
especially for the greater geographical region of 
southeast Europe. The latest developments of the 
debt crunch and its effects on the real economy 
as well as the banking sector have gradually 
shifted our interest towards a wider scope of 
interest that covers banking sector analysis and 
macroeconomic data that mutually interact. 
This article is part of a total that covers all major 
economies in the region.
PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
This paper offers a brief yet inclusive picture of 
the banking concentration and competition in a 
small transition economy such as FYROM’s. The 
period covered starts from 2003 and ends in 2011, 
covering two distinct economic phases: the first, 
from 2003 until 2007, phase was a period of global 
economic growth that had positive effects on the 
banking sector of the country, whereas the second 
period from 2008 to 2011 had been the time that 
the global financial crisis emerged and developed 
to a full extent. Our findings show that the market 
has been persistently operating under oligopolistic, 
if not monopolistic, conditions where the leading 
three or five institutions dominate the market. 
Foreign newcomers and legislative developments 
have not changed the situation during the past 
10 years and bank customers seem to keep their 
preferences unaffected, staying loyal to their 
prior choices. Another significant parameter that 
influences the developments in the domestic 
banking industry is the small market size.
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1. Introduction
Competition and concentration in the banking sector has attracted the interest of practitioners and 
academics mainly due to its significance in the economy in general. The level of concentration plays 
a catalytic role in the operations of each financial institution, since it affects its managerial decisions 
on the cost of services offered to their customers. Low levels of competition result in oligopolistic 
market structures, where customers cannot enjoy competitive products. In addition to the high cost 
of services, low competition leads to low interest for innovation and for covering the true needs of 
the consumers, whether households or companies.
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is a small country that has a developed 
and organized banking industry, which has gone through a process of modernization through the 
past 15 years. Just like most European countries in transition, the country has made steady and 
firm steps in increasing market liberalization by  applying the necessary legislation. This has led to 
foreign investors in the banking industry to be  attracted by the potential of the local market. Most 
foreign capital comes from the neighboring Balkan countries, since the financial capacity of the 
country is important yet limited due to its relative geographical size.
The issue of banking concentration and competition has gained new interest especially after 
the beginning of the contemporary financial crisis in 2008 that has practically reached the region 
in the year of 2009. Most of the countries in the region rely heavily on their banking sector and the 
survival of the financial institutions has become an issue of fundamental value in domestic econo-
mies. Although the country is not a member of the Eurozone, the majority of its trade in goods and 
services is Euro related and in general keeps very close ties with countries that belong to the 
monetary union. Analyzing the banking system in this country, we witness that the concentration 
in the banking system is relatively high in terms of all segments of banks operations. High 
 concentration is registered in several important banks with performances that played a dominat-
ing role in the total banking system, and, broadly speaking, in the domestic economy. On the other 
hand, the role of small-size banks is almost insignificant. Some of them face low volume of 
 activities and passive presence in the market. In the longer run, the future of these institutions 
is  in further market consolidation. The examination of the banking industry of FYROM offers 
 useful insights as it is a case of an economy in transition with specific characteristics that will be 
analyzed below.
2. Literature Review
The market structure of the banking sector has attracted plenty of attention from researchers 
around the globe as it determines the level of competition and efficiency that applies to each 
 country. In the case of the emerging countries and especially those newcomers from the eastern 
European region that switched their regime to the open economy, there has been an increased 
 interest in the analysis of their domestic markets as well as the cross-border implications. The story 
in most countries is similar: first, deregulation took place followed either by privatizations of state 
banks or entrance of foreign banking institutions that tried to capture market shares.
In their work, Andries and Capraru (2011) examine the liberalization and the reforms that took 
place in 17 central and eastern European countries, during the period 2004–2008. Their findings sug-
gest that EU member countries have managed to increase their financial liberalization levels further, 
resulting in more efficient and competitive services to their clients. On the other hand, nonEU 
 member countries have seen their efficiency levels remain relatively unchanged resulting in higher 
productivity growth figures for their financial institutions. Barisitz (2008) concentrates in the Balkan 
region countries and distinguishes two banking reform waves: the first focused on liberalization and 
the second on restructuring. The banking concentration figures however did not seem to follow the 
initial trend, with percentages remaining high for the major banking institutions.
In a paper dedicated to the country of FYROM, Giustiniani and Ross (2008) of the IMF examine the 
domestic case from the mid-90s when initial changes took effect. Their analysis covers up to the year of 
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2005, applying the Panzar and Rosse test on market structure and the H-statistic. Their findings suggest 
that the market competition is not high enough, resembling more a monopolistic or a perfect cartel situ-
ation, since the H-statistic is close to zero. In general, the banking sector remains relatively underdevel-
oped leading to a weak competition probably due to legal and institutional limitations. According to the 
authors, the major banks do not seem to have changed their preference for high profits, expecting the 
smaller “pocket banks” to compete for potential market shares with lower profit margins.
Maniatis (2006) examines the relationship of banking concentration and profitability in the Greek 
market, suggesting that monopolistic competition is dominant, with major state- and private-owned 
banks dominating the industry. Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) investigate 14 central and eastern 
European countries in transition, concluding that with the exception of FYROM and Slovakia, the rest 
operate under conditions of monopolistic competition. Applying the H-statistic methodology, the 
researchers are led to the conclusion that FYROM has weak competition levels similar to those of 
monopolistic markets.
In a paper that focuses on the Southeast European region Athanasoglou, Delis, and Staikouras 
(2008) examine the markets of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Romania, 
and Serbia-Montenegro. In a period of rigorous financial reforms (early 2000s), the markets of these 
countries have set the basis for more efficient banking systems, boasting however different levels of 
market concentration. Delis (2009) applies the Panzar and Rosse methodology in 22 central and 
eastern European countries and finds significantly different levels of banking concentration across 
the borders. The banking system of FYROM again exhibits low H-statistic figures, showing monopo-
listic type of market structure. Dumicic, Casni, and Cibaric (2008) analyze the banking concentration 
in the ex-Jugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia-Montenegro by applying the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and other concentration ratios. The authors conclude that the levels of 
concentration vary with Serbia and Croatia being the most efficient markets of the sample.
Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich (2004) offer a brief literature review on banking con-
centration articles around the world. As far as the developing markets, in particular, are concerned, 
the literature suggests that although greater concentration relates to less favorable prices for con-
sumers (and thus is not good from the social perspective), evidence is not robust enough. Smaller 
countries with less regulation witness lighter effects and have higher possibility for foreign banks’ 
entry. In their research, Claessens and Laeven (2004) analyze a huge sample of 50 countries using the 
Panzar and Rosse methodology. The range of the H-statistic and the five-bank concentration ratio 
vary across banking systems, reflecting different levels of competition, market liberalization, and 
structural forms. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) examine five Latin American countries, i.e. Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru in an effort to explain the effect of market concentration on bank 
spreads. In all cases, the market share of the top three or five banks exceeds 40% and the  Herfindahl–
Hirschman index is above 650 and in some cases above 1000. Concentration in these markets came 
as a result of the banking consolidation process that was materialized either by the acquisitions of 
domestic banks by foreign banks or by the mergers of domestic banks to withstand competition.
Tsiritakis and Tsirigotakis (2011) examine a large sample of 20 EU and Eurozone member coun-
tries using the Herfindahl–Hirschman index and the top three and five concentration indicators. 
Their general conclusion is that the European markets are characterized by levels of concentration 
that allow a monopolistic competition type of market structure, having a favorable effect on prices 
for consumers and credit access for firms. Monopolistic behavior is also found by Fosu (2013) who 
 examined banking competition in African sub-regional markets using a dynamic version of the 
 classical Panzar and Rosse model. Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006) examine a sample 
of old and new EU-member countries and their empirical results suggest a monopolistic competition 
market structure. Nevertheless, evidence is mixed when it comes to the revenues: interest revenues 
have been earned under higher competition in new EU countries, whereas the opposite holds for 
total operating revenues. Likewise, small banks seem to earn their interest revenues under lesser 
competition than larger banks, whereas the opposite again holds for total operating revenues. The 
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following table summarizes the basic conclusions of selected articles over a 30-year period in  various 
geographical areas of the world (Table 1).
The major contribution of this paper is that it covers a long period of the 2000s, in particular, from 
2003 to 2011, when significant changes had taken place both in and outside of the country. This 
period is divided into two sub-periods with completely different macroeconomic characteristics, 
having the contemporary financial crisis covering the second half from 2008 onward. Our intention 
is to offer a comprehensive picture of the condition of the domestic industry by using different 
 approaches to evaluate banking concentration.
3. Data and Methodology
The economic literature offers several methods for estimating market concentration and competi-
tion levels across industries. The most widely accepted tools applied in the banking industry are the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index and the CR3-CR5 indicators, and these are the ones selected for the 
current analysis of the domestic banking market of FYROM.
The Herfindahl index (also known as Herfindahl–Hirschman index, HHI) is estimated as follows:
where S denotes each bank’s share in the total amount of the analyzed category, i.e. total assets, 
total deposits, etc., and n denotes the total number of banks in the system. The values of the index 
usually range from 500 to 2000, with values around 500 revealing a highly competitive market, thus 
a low level of banking concentration. As the values approach the 1000 unit level, the market is 
 characterized as monopolistic competition and beyond the 1500 level, the concentration in the 
banking system is approaching the monopolistic, high concentration market structure.
HI=
n∑
j=1
(Sj)
2
Table 1. Research on Banking Concentration from Various Articles
Table caption. Yildirim and Philippatos (2007), Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006)
Authors Period Countries considered Results
Shaffer (1982) 1979 New York (USA) Monopolistic competition
Nathan and Neave (1989) 1982–1984 Canada Perfect competition (1982); 
monopolistic (1983–1984)
Lloyd-Williams et al. (1991) 1986–1988 Japan Monopoly
Molyneux et al. (1994) 1986–1989 France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the UK
Monopoly: Italy; monopolistic: 
France, Germany, Spain, UK
Vesala (1995) 1985–1992 Finland Monopolistic for all but two years 
– monopoly
Molyneux et al. (1996) 1986–1988 Japan Monopoly
Coccorese (1998) 1988–1996 Italy Monopolistic
Rime (1999) 1987–1994 Switzerland Monopolistic
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) 1989–1996 15 EU countries Monopolistic
De Bandt and Davis (2000) 1992–1996 France, Germany, Italy Monopolistic
Bikker and Haad (2000) 1988–1998 23 OECD countries Monopolistic
Drakos and Konstantinou (2003) 1992–2000 10 CEE countries Monopolistic (monopoly for 
Latvia)
Boutiller et al. (2004) 1993–2000 Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain
Monopolistic
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 1993–2000 14 CEE Countries Monopolistic (except for FYROM 
and Slovakia
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Source: NBRM, 2012.
In our current analysis, we have estimated the Herfindahl index on five banking variables, in 
particular:
• Household deposits
• Corporate deposits
• Household loans
• Corporate loans
• Total assets
In addition to the above, we are also applying the k bank concentration ratio that sums up the 
market shares of the k largest banks in the industry. The k bank ratios we applied are the CR3 (CR5) 
indicators that refer to the market share that the biggest three (five) banking institutions have in 
each variable. As far as the measure is regarded, there is no absolute rule of determination; higher 
the value, however, stronger the evidence that banking power concentration exist among a few 
banking institutions. Bearing the same concept as the HHI index, we are estimating the above- 
mentioned indicators for the same five banking variables. The estimated period for the CR3 ratio is 
from 2009 to 2011, whereas for the CR5 we offer a longer estimation covering from 2003 to 2011, in 
order to get an integrated view of the evolution of the domestic market.
The data-set covers the period from 2009 to 2011 and has been drawn from the central banking 
institution of the country, namely the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the 
individual figures that are reported by the banks operating in the country.
4. Analysis
The size of the banking sector in the country is relatively small for many reasons, both historical and 
practical. On the one hand, the republic has recently proceeded into legal reforms and regulations 
that led to market liberation and offered the necessary ground for increased market competition 
among the participants (both domestic and international). Likewise, the customer base has  improved 
its financial condition and both households and corporations increased their banking operations as 
lenders and creditors, adopting the banking behavior of the central and western European markets. 
Still, the country size is relatively small, leaving little space for large-scale banking operations; the 
same holds true for the per capita income and the total corporate activity. All the above combined 
lead to characterizing the market in a transition stage, where the market has moved away from its 
protective,closed condition of the past.
In order to have a more comprehensive picture of the characteristics of the banking industry in 
FYROM, we first offer some basic statistical figures before we estimate and evaluate the HHI index and 
the CR3-CR5 indicators. The first distinctive attribute of the domestic market is the geographical con-
centration of the branches. Figure 1 shows that almost half of the branches (41%) are located in the 
region of the capital city of Skopje. There is no other region that boasts an equally high concentration 
of bank branches, with most remaining regions having about 10% each. This is contrary to the real 
population breakdown, as the capital city accounts only for about 25% of the country’s population.
Analyzing the bank activities during 2011 and 2012, they kept on increasing although at a  slower 
pace compared to the preceding years, which accelerate the uptrend of financial intermediation. 
Figure 1. Geographical 
breakdown of bank branches.
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The increase of financial intermediation was faster, taking into consideration  deposits -to- GDP 
ratio, due to their faster growth compared to the growth of loans of nonfinancial entities. But, 
banks in FYROM were still very careful when taking risks and making assessments, which is closely 
related to the euro area debt crisis and uncertainty surrounding the recovery of domestic 
 economic activity.
Traditional banking, loan and deposit activity with domestic nonfinancial entities, dominates the 
banking business in FYROM. This type of bank business model, taking into consideration the credit risk, 
also creates a bank-run risk and maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, as nonfinancial 
entities mostly save in a short run, and borrow in longer runs. On the other hand, and conversely, 
 usually traditional banking is associated with low exposure to market risks or risks arising from 
 operations with composite financial instruments. But, banks in this country tend to avoid market risk 
by including clauses in the agreements on specific financial instruments and to alter such risk in 
 another types of risk, primarily credit risk (Figure 2).
In terms of market consolidation, in 2011 the number of banks reduced by one as a result of the 
acquisition of one small-size bank by another bank (last event of this type happened in 2006 for the 
last time, when two banks merged). Usually, acquisitions or mergers of banks tend to consolidate 
individual institutions, improve their competitiveness in the system, increase portfolio diversifica-
tion, and improve efficiency by increasing income and market share and costs. Market consolidation 
of the domestic banking system will continue in the period ahead. The fact that the assets of the 
largest bank in the system is 90 times as high compared to the smallest bank is an illustration of the 
modest volume of activities and passiveness of some banks. On the other hand, there are banks that 
finance most of their activities using shareholder equity (as of 31 December 2011, the share of 
 equity and reserves in the total sources of funding of one bank reached 45%) or invest most of their 
assets in low-risk bills issued by the government or the central bank (as of 31 December 2011, above 
50% of the total assets of some banks was invested in treasury and CB bills).
Another significant characteristic of the domestic banking market is the ownership share of 
 foreign investors. As of December 2011, 13 out of a total of 17 banks in the country were mainly 
owned by foreign shareholders. This has been achieved mainly through the acquisition of local exist-
ing institutions by foreign capital and less with direct entrance of new institutions, as a result of the 
liberalization that took place in the second half of the 2000s. Figure 3 shows the country origin of 
the major shareholders of the domestic banks, with Greece representing about a quarter followed by 
Slovenia and Turkey. Nevertheless, these ownership shares have not been constant for the last few 
years; Greek participation in particular has been falling from a high of about 30% in 2008 to 24% 
in 2011 (further reduced in the end of 2012 according to unofficial data) due to the financial crisis in 
Figure 2. Activities of the 
banking system in FYROM.
Source: NBRM and bank 
reports, 2002–2011.
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the Greek economy. Turkey on the other hand, has seen its participation increasing steadily for the 
last four years starting from less than 5% in 2008 to 16% in 2011. As a result, the situation is still 
under formation and remains sensitive to the developments in the country of origin of each major 
shareholder.
The HHI index is reported in Table 2 for the five banking variables that we tested in our analysis. 
The first observation leads to a rather clear conclusion: the banking market in FYROM is generally 
highly concentrated with HHI figures in some cases exceeding the 2000 units level. First, the 
 household sector both in deposits and in loans appears to have the highest HHI scores, staying 
 between the high levels of 2000–2100 units during the whole period under examination. There 
seems to be a marginal downward trend through the years (revealing a slight improvement in 
 competition status) but the figures remain still too high. Individuals in the country appear to have 
more trust in a few banks and thus feel more confident with them, depositing their savings with 
these few and selecting to take credit through them. Smaller banks fail to attract deposits and 
seem unable to convince individual customers that they are equally competitive and worth doing 
business with.
On the other hand, the situation in the corporate world is a little different. The concentration levels 
are not identical as far as deposits and credit are concerned, with deposits appearing to have signifi-
cantly lower HHI values than loans. The deposits’ HHI figures are at about 1500 during the period, 
showing no steady trend through the years; the loans’ HHI figures remain almost constant at about 
1850–1900 units. Clearly the market for corporate deposits is less concentrated than the one for 
corporate credit. In fact, the corporate deposit market appears to be the most competitive out of the 
five market segments examined in this article. However, bigger banks manage to attract higher 
shares than smaller ones in corporate credit, which is quite a profitable market segment. Higher 
market concentration in this segment also leads to a cycle of events since it creates stronger 
Table 2. HHI Index for Five Banking Variables
Year Household 
deposits
Corporate 
deposits
Household 
loans
Corporate 
loans
Total assets
2003 2680 2080 1580 1790 1820
2004 2590 1985 1790 1690 1730
2005 2410 1850 2060 1755 1710
2006 2230 1800 2015 1800 1640
2007 2105 1790 2090 1810 1670
2008 2095 1640 1950 1860 1580
2009 2100 1300 2060 1900 1600
2010 2080 1600 2050 1850 1580
2011 2010 1530 2010 1820 1520
Source: NBRM and individual bank reports, 2004–2012
Figure 3. Capital ownership by 
country.
Source: NBRM, 2012.
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business ties and safeguards future cooperation between each bank and its professional  customers. 
In other words, the current situation of market concentration will most probably be maintained in 
the near future, since companies develop professional relationships and it is difficult to switch bank-
ing partners.
Finally, as far as the total assets variable is regarded, the HHI figures are showing a marginal 
downward trend during the period. Values are at the 1500–1600 range revealing lower concentra-
tion in the market. Compared to the previous four variables, there seems to be a contradiction: the 
few banks that dominate the market in deposits and loans do not also boast equally high levels in 
total assets. Thus, bank size (expressed by total assets) does not seem to influence the operations 
and the market share in each variable. This unavoidably leads to other reasons that could justify the 
high concentration values in deposits and loans, for instance interest rates policies, bank reputation, 
marketing, and geographical presence.
Another method to evaluate the banking concentration is the CR3 and CR5 indicators that report 
the percentage that the first three and five institutions hold in each banking variable. Table 3 reports 
the respective figures for CR3 from 2009 to 2011 and for CR5 from 2003 to 2011. Data were not 
 available for the CR3 indicator in earlier years; nevertheless, it is made obvious that the percentages 
of CR3 and CR5 are quite close. This verifies the fact that the leading three institutions in the country 
account for the majority of the market share in each sub-category, followed by the next two institu-
tions in smaller terms, thus yielding the CR5 indicator (Figure 5).
A closer look on the evolution of the CR5 indicator shows a highly concentrated market in practi-
cally all five variables. As far as the deposits are concerned, both household and corporate, the fig-
ures stay above the 80% level throughout the period; customers trusting their deposits with the 
leading financial institutions without showing any signs of changing their preferences. In household 
deposits, there is a marginal decline from the highest 87.5% in 2003 to 82.9% in 2011; the same 
Source: NBRM and individual 
bank reports, 2004–2012.
Figure 4. Development of HHI 
index for all banking variables 
2003–2011.
Source: NBRM and individual 
bank reports, 2004–2012.
Figure 5. Development of 
CR5 indicator for all banking 
variables 2003–2011.
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 applies for corporate deposits that started at 82.2% in 2003 and ended at 83.5% in 2011, demon-
strating a persistent pattern for all customers.
In general, the same applies for the CR3 indicator during the period, with an exception on corpo-
rate deposits’ percentage, which appeared to decline steadily in 2010 and 2011 for the top three 
institutions, yet remaining equally high for the CR5 indicator. There seems to be a shifting of custom-
ers only within the top five banks that maintain their aggregate market share, not leaving any room 
for smaller banks to grow.
The situation appears almost identical in household and corporate credit. Figures here are slightly 
lower, balancing around the 80% level during the 2003–2011 period. In particular, household loans 
seem to get even more concentrated from 2003 to 2011, since the CR5 indicator started at about 
74% in 2003 and climbed to 82% in 2011. Clearly, smaller institutions not only fail to acquire market 
share but they appear to lose part of their penetration in favor of the leading institutions. The CR3 
indicator again reveals a reallocation of market shares among the top five institutions, preventing 
any of the smaller banks to threaten their market dominance.
Finally, as far as the total assets variable is concerned, the CR5 and CR3 indicators remain essen-
tially constant during the period under examination. A fact worth mentioning is that the leading five 
institutions represent smaller percentages in this variable compared to the previous four, showing 
that they manage to acquire bigger market shares in deposits and credit without over-developing 
their company size (expressed by total assets).
This could probably mean that with the same level of assets they achieve better results, thus being 
more efficient and profitable to their shareholders, compared to the rest of the competition that fails 
to take advantage of their respective size. Figure 4 visualizes the evolution of the CR5 indicator for 
each one of the five variables from 2003 to 2011.
During the years of the crisis in the Eurozone, banks’ earnings and operational efficiency are de-
creasing. The number of banks that reported loss increased from four in 2010 to six in 2011. Also, the 
market share of the banks that reported losses increased comparing the years 2010 and 2011. If this 
trend continues in the following years, it is obvious that the banking system will have huge negative 
effects taking into consideration the long-term stability.
Table 3. CR3 and CR5 Indicators
Indicator Year Household 
deposits (%)
Corporate 
deposits (%)
Household 
loans (%)
Corporate 
loans (%)
Total assets 
(%)
CR3 2009 76.4 71.1 68.3 71.4 67.5
2010 76.7 62.5 68.6 69.2 66.0
2011 75.0 57.5 67.7 67.4 64.0
CR5 2003 87.5 82.2 73.8 82.1 76.0
2004 85.9 83.9 76.0 79.9 76.1
2005 84.0 81.1 78.0 78.2 75.0
2006 82.5 81.2 78.3 78.1 74.7
2007 84.0 81.8 80.0 78.9 75.9
2008 84.8 79.9 80.5 79.2 76.0
2009 85.7 81.5 81.2 81.3 77.4
2010 84.9 83.3 79.3 81.1 77.2
2011 82.9 83.5 78.8 81.7 76.6
Source: NBRM and individual bank reports, 2004–2012
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [G
oc
e D
elc
ev
 - 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
in 
St
ip]
 at
 02
:38
 23
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
Page 10 of 12
Hourvouliades & Davcev, Cogent Economics & Finance (2014), 2: 895395
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2014.895395
 
The positive performance of banks that cover the operating expenses with the created income has 
a declining trend during 2011. The net interest income remained almost unchanged compared to 
2010, after the huge decline in 2008 and 2009. The growth of net income from fees and  commissions 
is more than three times lower compared to the increase registered in 2010. Other regular incomes 
registered huge growth on the income side (primarily capital income based on sale of assets and 
income on other bases), which cannot be considered a stable form of income. On the other hand, the 
growth of banks’ operating expenses accelerated, and impairment is among the balance sheet 
items with the fastest growth rate in 2011, due to the banks’ higher credit risk. These obvious trends 
can be seen from the graph below.
The main component in the formation of total banks’ income in FYROM is the net interest income. 
Thus, earnings of the banking system are particularly sensitive to the changes in interest rates on 
interest-bearing assets and liabilities, and their risk, volume, and structure. There are some implica-
tions concerning this type of structure of total banks’ income that can cause important negative 
effects to the Macedonian banking system and its earnings. There are potential problems when 
 attracting new sources of funds or refinancing of the existing ones, materialization of credit risk, 
changes in the assets structure in favor of assets that bear lower interest income, pressures for 
downward correction of lending interest rates and no possibilities for downward corrections of 
 deposit interest rates (Figure 6).
Most of the total banks’ incomes are used for covering employee costs, impairment and general and 
administrative costs. Banks’ operating costs could be rationalized by the broader use of e-banking. In 
recent years, banks in FYROM undertook a wide range of activities to introduce e-banking and make it 
popular to their clients. Although this trend is not reaching the level that developed European countries 
have, it is having a significant uptrend that can positively affect the operating cost rationalization.
5. Conclusion
This paper attempts to give a brief yet inclusive picture of banking concentration and competition in 
a small transition economy such as FYROM’s. It includes a period starting from 2003 to 2011, 
 covering two distinct economic phases: the first, from 2003 until 2007, was a period of global 
 economic growth that had positive effects on the banking sector of the country, whereas the second 
period from 2008 to 2011 had been the time that the global financial crisis emerged and developed 
to a full extent. Common sense stipulates that during a financial crisis, customers of all kinds (i.e. 
individuals and companies) become more risk averse and trust bigger and safer banks for their 
 operations. On the contrary, during the first period, when the country has witnessed significant 
growth and market liberalization policies, one would expect competition to emerge and increase. 
Source: NBRM and bank 
reports, 2008–2011.
Figure 6. Operational 
performance of the banking 
system (2008–2011).
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An examination of the case of FYROM shows that the market did not show signs of progress in bank 
competition in general. The concentration of market shares under both the HHI index and the CR3-
CR5 indicators remains high throughout the whole sample. In fact, concentration levels are so high 
for the leading five  institutions that their market shares did not increase during the crisis period of 
2008–2011, since they were already at high levels.
Foreign banking institutions that entered the market did not have an effect on concentration 
 either. There is no instance of a new bank that succeeded in growing substantially by gaining new 
market shares in any of the five variables. In essence, most new entrants merged or acquired the 
operations and network of the existing domestic banks, leading to no significant difference in terms 
of concentration. On the other hand, households and corporations did not change their preferences 
and continued to cooperate and trust the same banks as before.
Another significant parameter that influences the developments in the domestic banking industry is 
the size of the market. The market is objectively small, thus not allowing for economies of scale to be 
achieved, just like in most other cases in other CEE countries. The limited market size (low M/GDP ratio), 
although it grew through the years, still remained well below international levels, raising cost  efficiency 
levels for smaller banking institutions. The pre-crisis average deposits per bank were  between €1.5 and 
€2.5 billion, while a minimum level of about €10 billion per bank is necessary according to international 
standards. Taking into consideration the current debt crisis conditions that ask for  further strengthen-
ing of the banks, it becomes further obvious why one would expect further concentration instead of 
de-concentration. The high costs, the minimum bank size, and the efficient levels of operation 
 altogether make it rather inevitable that the domestic market will remain concentrated.
In this context, the country’s leading banks are mainly foreign owned, just like in most CEE 
 countries, as a result of the mergers and acquisitions that took place in these markets the last 
10 years. Domestic owners were found with limited capital and resources, inadequate know-how, 
and restricted access to fund markets. As a result, incoming foreign institutions were regarded 
 rather as a indispensable solution and most domestic banks were positive to such a development. 
Foreign banks, on the other hand, found it more efficient to acquire and upgrade an existing banking 
 network rather than starting from scratch in such a small market.
Further investigation into this matter should include analysis of other qualitative factors that influ-
ence the consumers’ behavior in the country. The small size of the market, as above analyzed, could 
be one of them since it leaves little room for efficient new entrants and new investments. Furthermore, 
domestic culture could be another reason that leads to trusting only the leading banking  institutions. 
Quality of personnel, organizational issues, and geographical coverage could also be parameters 
that keep the existing status quo unchanged for almost a decade during the 2000s. In all, the 
 domestic market fails to improve the terms of competition despite the progress in legislation and 
modernization in the field, yielding most certainly a monopolistic type of services that is not  beneficial 
at all for its customers.
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